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Abstract. In this paper, we revisit meet-in-the-middle attacks on AES in the single-key model and improve
on Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir attacks at Asiacrypt 2010. We present the best attack on 7 rounds
of AES-128 where data/time/memory complexities are below 2100. Moreover, we are able to extend the
number of rounds to reach attacks on 8 rounds for both AES-192 and AES-256. This gives the best
attacks on those two versions with a data complexity of 2107 chosen-plaintexts, a memory complexity of
296 and a time complexity of 2172 for AES-192 and 2196 for AES-256. Finally, we also describe the best
attack on 9 rounds of AES-256 with 2120 chosen plaintexts and time and memory complexities of 2203.
All these attacks have been found by carefully studying the number of reachable multisets in Dunkelman
et al. attacks.
1 Introduction
The Rijndael block cipher has been designed by Daemen and Rijmen in 1997 and accepted as the AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) standard since October 2000 by the NIST. Nowadays, it is probably the most
used block cipher. It has very good performances in both software and hardware on various platforms and it is
provably resistant against differential and linear attacks.
However, new attacks have been recently developed using many ideas from the cryptanalysis of hash func-
tions. The first analysis studies AES in the strong adversarial model where the adversary can ask the encryption
of a message under a related-key by specifying the relation. Biryukov, Khovratovich and Nikolic show some
drawbacks of the key-schedule algorithms and how to exploit it to mount an attack on the full versions of
AES-192 and AES-256 in [4,5,6]. In a second analysis, Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir show in [15] more effi-
cient meet-in-the-middle attacks using ideas from rebound attacks on hash functions [22]. Finally, the biclique
attack [8] also uses meet-in-the-middle ideas for preimage attacks on hash functions by Sasaki et al. [1]. It has
been developed by Bogdanov, Khovratovich and Rechberger in [8] and allows to mount an attack on the full
AES for all versions with a marginal time complexity over exhaustive search.
Overview of the attacks on AES. The first attack on AES is the SQUARE attack, proposed by Daemen,
Knudsen and Rijmen on the SQUARE block cipher [10]. In [11], Daemen and Rijmen remark that if we encrypt
a δ-set, i.e. a set of 256 plaintexts where a byte (called active byte) can take all values and the 15 other
bytes are constant, after 3 rounds of Rijndael, the sum of each byte of the 256 ciphertexts equals zero. This
distinguishing property can be used to mount efficient attacks up to 6 rounds. The first attack has a time
complexity of 272 encryptions and requires 232 messages, and it has been improved by Ferguson et al. to 246
operations in [16].
Then, Gilbert and Minier show in [18] that this property can be made more precise using functions of the
active byte, which allows to build a distinguisher on 3 rounds. The main idea is to consider the set of functions
mapping one active byte to one byte after 3 rounds. This set depends on 9 one-byte parameters so that the
whole set can be described using a table of 272 entries of a 256-byte sequence (f(0), . . . , f(255)). Their attack
allows to break 7 rounds of AES with a marginal time complexity over exhaustive search. This idea has been
generalized at Fse 2008 by Demirci and Selçuk in [12] using meet-in-the-middle techniques, whereas Gilbert
and Minier used collision between the functions. More specifically, they show that on 4 rounds, the value of each
byte of the ciphertext can be described by a function of the active byte parameterized by 25 in [12] and 24 8-bit
parameters in [13]. The last improvement is due to the observation that the 25th parameter is a key byte which
is constant for all functions. Consequently, by considering (f(0)−f(0), f(1)−f(0), . . . , f(255)−f(0)) we can use
only 24 parameters. The main drawback of the meet-in-the-middle attack is the memory requirement. Indeed,
the basic attack only works for the 256-bit version and then Demirci and Selçuk have to use a time/memory
tradeoff to extend the attack for the 192-bit AES version.
Another idea has been developed by Biham and Keller [3] and is based on a 4-round impossible differential,
as well as the work of Bahrak and Aref in [2]. Later, this idea has been refined by Lu, Dunkelman, Keller and
Kim in [20]. At the present time, it is the most efficient attack on 7-round AES-128.
At Asiacrypt 2010, Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir develop many new ideas to solve the memory problems
of the Demirci and Selçuk attacks. First of all, they show that instead of storing the whole sequence, we can only
store the associated multiset, i.e. the unordered sequence with multiplicity rather than the ordered sequence.
This reduces the table by a factor 4 and avoids the need to guess one key byte during the attack. The second and
main idea is the differential enumeration which allows to reduce the number of parameters that describes the
set of functions from 24 to 16. However, to reduce this number, they rely on a special property on a truncated
differential characteristic. The idea consists in using a differential truncated characteristic whose probability is
not too small. The property of this characteristic is that the set of functions from one state to the state after
4 rounds can only take a restricted number of values, which is much smaller than the number of all functions.
The direct consequence is an increase of the amount of needed data, but the memory requirement is reduced
to 2128 and the same analysis also applies to the 128-bit version. However, this attack is not better than the
impossible differential attack even though many tradeoffs could be used.
Finally, at Crypto 2011, Bouillaguet, Derbez and Fouque describe in [9] new meet-in-the-middle attacks
that allow to efficiently break a small number of rounds of AES using a very small amount of data. These attacks
have been found automatically. Similar attacks have been developed against other symmetric schemes that reuse
AES component such as the Pelican-MAC message authentication code or the LEX stream cipher. However,
the complexity of the algorithm that looks for the best attack is exponential in the number of variables and if
we try to take into account more rounds or more plaintext/ciphertext pairs, then the program does not find
anything of interest. This tool looks promising since improvements on existing attacks usually consider a small
number of rounds. For instance, if we want to improve on Dunkelman et al. attacks, we need to study 4 rounds
of AES.
Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir’s Attack. In [15], a new attack is developed using ideas from differential
and meet-in-the-middle attacks. In the first stage, differential attacks find a differential characteristic with high
or low probability covering many rounds. Then, in the online stage, the adversary asks for the encryption of
many pairs: for each pair, the adversary tries to decrypt by guessing the last subkey and if the differential
characteristic is followed, then the adversary increases the counter of the associated subkey. If the probability
of the characteristic is high enough, then the counter corresponding to the right secret-key would be among the
higher counters. In some case, it is also possible to add some rounds at the beginning by guessing part of the
first subkeys.
Here, Dunkelman et al. propose a novel differential attack. Instead of increasing a counter once a pair is
found, the adversary uses another test to eliminate the wrong guesses of the first or last subkeys. This test
decides with probability one whether the middle rounds are covered with the differential. The idea is that the
middle rounds follow a part of the differential and the function f that associates each byte of the input state
to one byte of the output state can be stored efficiently. Demirci and Selçuk propose to store in a table the
function with no differential characteristic, which turns out to be much larger that this one. Consequently, in
Dunkelman et al.’s attack, the adversary guesses the first and last subkeys and looks for a pair that follows the
beginning and last rounds of the differential characteristic. Once such a pair is found, the adversary takes one of
the messages that follows the characteristic and constructs a structure to encrypt which is related to a δ-set for
the intermediate rounds. From the encryption of this set, the adversary can decrypt the last rounds and check
whether the encryption of this δ-set belongs to the table. If this is the case, then the part of the first and last
subkeys are correct and an exhaustive search on the other parts of the key allows to find the whole key.
To construct the table, the idea is similar to the attack. We need to find a pair of messages that satisfies
the truncated differential characteristic. Then, we take one message in the pair and we compute the function f .
Dunkelman et al. use a rebound technique to find the pair that follows the characteristic.
Our Results. Dunkelman et al. show that by using a particular 4-round differential characteristic with a not
too small probability, the active states in the middle of the characteristic can only take 264 values. In their
characteristic, they also need to consider the same 8 key bytes as Demirci and Selçuk. They claim that "In
order to reduce the size of the precomputed table, we would like to choose the δ-set such that several of these
parameters will equal to predetermined constants. Of course, the key bytes are not known to the adversary and
thus cannot be "replaced" by such constants". Here, we show that it is possible to enumerate the whole set of
solutions more efficiently than by taking all the values for the key bytes such that every value of these bytes
are possible. We show that the whole set can take only 280 values with this efficient enumeration technique. Of
course, it might be possible to improve this result to 264 but not any further since the key bytes may take all
the 264 possible values. Using the same ideas, we show that it is possible to have an efficient enumeration for a
5-round differential characteristic which allows us to mount an attack on 9 rounds for AES-256. The bottleneck
of the attack is no longer the memory, but the time and data complexities.
In this paper, we show that the number of parameters describing the functions can be further reduced to
10 and that this attack is now more efficient than the impossible differential attack [20]. We describe the best
key-recovery attacks on 7 rounds of all versions of AES with all complexities below 2100, as the related-key
attack of Biryukov and Nikolic` in [7]. We also show improved key-recovery attacks on 8 rounds of AES-192 and
on 8 and 9 rounds of AES-256. Additionally, we show that all our attacks are optimal in the class of attacks
from [15] that we revisit. We also show that it allows us to attack one more round on AES-256, and for the
AES-192 the attack is comparable even though some improvements can be made. To this end, we use several
tradeoffs proposed by Dunkelman et al. and we use a more careful analysis of the enumeration technique.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we describe the AES and some properties used by the previous
attacks on this block cipher. In Section 3, we present our basic attack on 7 rounds for all AES versions. Then,
in section Section 4, we show that we can also attack 8 rounds for AES-192 and AES-256 and 9 rounds for
AES-256.
2 AES and Previous Work
2.1 Description of the AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [23] is a Substitution-Permutation Network that can be instantiated
using three different key bit-lengths: 128, 192, and 256. The 128-bit plaintext initializes the internal state viewed
as a 4 × 4 matrix of bytes as values in the finite field GF (28), which is defined via the irreducible polynomial
x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 over GF (2). Depending on the version of the AES, Nr rounds are applied to that state:
Nr = 10 for AES-128, Nr = 12 for AES-192 and Nr = 14 for AES-256. Each of the Nr AES round (Figure 1a)
applies four operations to the state matrix (except the last one where we omit the MixColumns):
– AddRoundKey (AK) adds a 128-bit subkey to the state.
– SubBytes (SB) applies the same 8-bit to 8-bit invertible S-Box S 16 times in parallel on each byte of the
state,
– ShiftRows (SR) shifts the i-th row left by i positions,
– MixColumns (MC) replaces each of the four column C of the state by M ×C where M is a constant 4× 4
maximum distance separable matrix over GF (28),
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(b) Ordering.
Figure 1: Description of one AES round and the ordering of bytes in an internal state.
After theNr-th round has been applied, a final subkey is added to the internal state to produce the ciphertext.
The key expansion algorithms to produce the Nr +1 subkeys for all AES variants are described in Appendix B.
We refer to the official specification document [23] for further details.
Proposition 1 (Differential Property of S). Given ∆i and ∆o two non-zero differences in F256, the equation
S(x) + S(x+∆i) = ∆o, (1)
has one solution in average. This property also applies to S−1.
Proof. To prevent the prediction of the propagation of differences in the AES, the SBox S as been chosen so
that all differences behave equivalently: none is more frequent than the others. Consequently, the number of
solutions N(∆i, ∆o) of the 8-bit equation (1) is almost constant for any choice of ∆i and ∆o. In average, we get
a constant number of solutions: in general zero or two, and more rarely four. In detail, for a fixed ∆i, among
the 28− 1 possible ∆o, there are 27− 2 of them for which N(∆i, ∆o) = 0, another 27− 1 so that N(∆i, ∆o) = 2
and the remaining one gives N(∆i, ∆o) = 4. Due to symmetry, an even number of solutions means that both x
and x +∆i are valid. In other words, in average, there is one solution to this equation. Consequently, if both
input and output differences ∆i and ∆o are known, then the values are also known. This property allows to
deduce the values from the knowledge of the differences. uunionsq
Notations and units. In this paper, we count the AES rounds from 0 and we refer to a particular byte of an
internal state x by x[i], as depicted in Figure 1b, or x[i, . . . , j] for bytes as positions between i and j. Moreover, as
shown in Figure 1a, in the ith round, we denote the internal state after AddRoundKey by xi, after SubBytes
by yi, after ShiftRows by zi and after MixColumns by wi. To refer to the difference in a state x, we use the
notation ∆x. The first added subkey is the master key k−1, and the one added after round i is denoted by ki.
In some cases, we are interested in swapping the order of the MixColumns and AddRoundKey operations.
As these operations are linear they can be interchanged, by first XORing the data with an equivalent key and
applying theMixColumns operation afterwards. We denote the equivalent subkey for this new round-function
description by:
ui = MC−1(ki) =

14 11 13 9
9 14 11 13
13 9 14 11
11 13 9 14
× ki (2)
We measure memory complexities of our attacks in number of 128-bit AES blocks and time complexities in
terms of AES encryptions.
In the following sections, we use particular structures of messages captured by Definition 1 and Definition 2.
Definition 1 (δ-set, [11]). Let a δ-set be a set of 256 AES-states that are all different in one state bytes (the
active byte) and all equal in the other state bytes (the inactive bytes).
Definition 2 (Multisets of bytes). A multiset generalizes the set concept by allowing elements to appear
more than once. Here, a multiset of 256 bytes can take as many as
(
28+28−1
28
) ≈ 2506.17 different values. From
the point of view of information theory, we can represent such a multiset on 512 bits: we propose a way to do
so in Appendix A.
2.2 Attack Scheme
In this section, we present a unified view of the previously known meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on
AES [12, 15, 18], where n rounds of the block cipher can be split into three consecutive parts of n1, n2 and n3
rounds, n = n1 + n2 + n3, such that a particular set of messages may verify a certain property that we denote
F in the sequel in the middle n2 rounds (Figure 2).
n1 rounds n2 rounds n3 rounds
F
Figure 2: General scheme of the meet-in-the-middle attack on AES, where some messages in the middle rounds may
verify a certain F property used to perform the meet-in-the-middle.
The general attack uses three successive steps:
Precomputation phase
1. In this phase, we build a lookup table T containing all the possible sequences constructed from a δ-set
such that one message verifies the F property.
Online phase
2. Then, in the online phase, we need to identify a δ-set containing a message m verifying the desired
property.
3. Finally, we partially decrypt the associated δ-set through the last n3 rounds and check whether it belongs
to T .
The two steps of the online phase require to guess some key bytes while the goal of this attack is to filter some
of their values. In the best case, only the right ones should pass the test.
Demirci and Selçuk Attack. The starting point is to consider the set of functions
f : {0, 1}8 → {0, 1}8
that maps a byte of a δ-set to another byte of the state after four AES rounds. A convenient way is to view f as
an ordered byte sequence (f(0), . . . , f(255)) so that it can be represented by 256 bytes. The crucial observation
made by the generalizing Gilbert and Minier attack is that this set is tiny since it can be described using 25
byte-parameters (225·8 = 2200) compared with the set of all functions of this type which counts as many as
28·2
8
= 22048 elements. Considering the differences (f(0) − f(0), f(1) − f(0), . . . , f(255) − f(0)) rather than
values, the set of functions can be described by 24 parameters. Dunkelman et al. identify these parameters as
follows:
– the full state x3 of message 0,
– four bytes of state x2 of message 0,
– four bytes of subkey k3.
The four bytes of the state x2 only depend on the column of z1 where the active byte of the δ-set is located;
for instance, if it is column 0, then those bytes are x2[0, 1, 2, 3]. Similarly, the four bytes of k3 depend on the
column of x5 where the byte we want to determine is located; as an example, if it is column 0, then those bytes
are k3[0, 5, 10, 15].
In their attacks [12], Demirci and Selçuk use the F property that does not filter any message. Consequently,
they do not require to identify a particular message m. The data complexity of their basic attack is very small
and around 232. However, since there is no particular property, the size of the table T is very large and the basic
attack only works for the AES-256. To mount an attack on the AES-192, they consider some time/memory
tradeoff. More precisely, the table T does not contain all the possible states, but only a fraction α. Consequently,
a specific δ-set may not be in the table T , so that we have to wait for this event and redo the attack O(1/α)
times on average. The attack becomes probabilistic and the memory requirement makes the attack possible
for AES-192. The consequence of this advanced version of the attack, which also works for AES-256, is that
the amount of data increases a lot. The time and memory requirement of the precomputation phase is due to
the construction of table T that contains messages for the n2 = 4 middle rounds, which counts as many as
2 8·24 = 2192 ordered sequences of 256 bytes.
Finally, it is possible to remove from each function some output values. Since we know that these functions
can be described by the key of 24 or 32 bytes, one can reduce T by a factor 10 or 8 by storing only the first
differences. Such an observation has been used by Wei et al. in [24].
Dunkelman et al. Attack. In [15], Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir introduced two new improvements to
further reduce the memory complexity of [12]. The first one uses multisets, behaving as unordered sequences, and
the authors show that there is still enough information so that the attack succeeds. The second improvement
uses a particular 4-round differential characteristic (Figure 3) to reduce the size of the precomputed lookup
table T , at the expense of trying more pairs of messages to expect at least one to conform to the truncated
characteristic.
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Figure 3: The four middle rounds used in the 7-round attack from [15]. Dashed bytes are active, others inactive.
The main idea of the differential characteristic is to fix the values of as many state-bytes as possible to a
constant. Assume now we have a message m such that we have a pair (m,m′) that satisfies the whole 7-round
differential characteristic and our goal is to recover the key. Contrary to classical differential attacks, where the
adversary guesses some bytes of the last subkey and eliminates the wrong guess, the smart idea of Dunkelman
et al. is to use a table to recover the right key more efficiently. Usually, differential attacks do not use memory
to recover the key or to find the right pair. The attack principle consists in constructing the δ-set from m which
can be made since we already have to guess some key bytes to check if the pair (m,m′) has followed the right
differential characteristic. Then, the table allows to identify the right key from the encryption of the δ-set.
It is now easy to see that the differential characteristic can be described using only 16 bytes. The states x3
and y3 can only take 232 possible differences each, so that the number of solutions for these two states is 264.
We also have the 4 key-bytes of u2 and the 4 key-bytes of k3 corresponding to the active bytes of Figure 3 in
states z2 and x4.
The following Table 1 shows the best cryptanalysis of AES variants, including our new results detailed in
this article.
Table 1: Current cryptanalysis of (reduced-round) AES variants in the secret-key model.
Cipher Rounds Data (CP) Time Memory Technique Reference
AES-128
7 2112.2 2117.2 2112.2 Impossible Differential [20]
7 2106.2 2110.2 290.2 Impossible Differential [21]
7 2116 2116 2116 Meet-in-the-Middle [15]
7 2105 299 290 Meet-in-the-Middle Section 3
7 297 299 298 Meet-in-the-Middle Section 3
8 288 2125.3 28 Bicliques [8]
10 (full) 288 2126.2 28 Bicliques [8]
AES-192
7 2116 2116 2116 MITM [15]
7 299 299 296 Meet-in-the-Middle Section 3
8 2113 2172 2129 Meet-in-the-Middle [15]
8 2113 2172 282 Meet-in-the-Middle Section 4.1
8 2107 2172 296 Meet-in-the-Middle Section 4.1
9 280 2188.8 28 Bicliques [8]
12 (full) 280 2189.4 28 Bicliques [8]
AES-256
7 2116 2116 2116 Meet-in-the-Middle [15]
7 299 298 296 Meet-in-the-Middle Section 3
8 2113 2196 2129 Meet-in-the-Middle [15]
8 2113 2196 282 Meet-in-the-Middle Section 4.1
8 2107 2196 296 Meet-in-the-Middle Section 4.1
9 2120 2251.9 28 Bicliques [8]
9 2120 2203 2203 Meet-in-the-Middle Section 4.2
14 (full) 240 2254.4 28 Bicliques [8]
CP: Chosen-plaintext.
3 New Attack on AES
In this section, we describe our basic attack on AES, which is independent of the key schedule algorithms.
We begin in Section 3.1 by describing an efficient way to enumerate and store all the possible multisets in
the middle that are used to mount the meet-in-the-middle attack. We continue in Section 3.2 by applying the
general scheme previously described to construct a key-recovery attack on all AES versions reduced to 7 rounds.
Finally, in Section 3.3, we show that modifying slightly the property for the middle rounds allows to trade some
memory for data and time.
3.1 Efficient Tabulation
As in the previous results, our attack also uses a large memory lookup table constructed in the precomputation
phase, and used in the online phase. Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir showed that if a messagem belongs to a pair
of states conforming to the truncated differential characteristic of Figure 3, then the multiset of differences∆x5[0]
obtained from the δ−set constructed from m in x1 can only take 2128 values, because 16 of the 24 parameters
used to build the multisets can take only 264 values instead of 2128. We make the following proposition that
reduces the size of the table by a factor 248.
Proposition 2. If a message m belongs to a pair of states conforming to the truncated differential characteristic
of Figure 3, then the multiset of differences ∆x5[0] obtained from the δ−set constructed from m in x1 can only
take 280 values. More precisely, the 24 parameters (which are state bytes of m) can take only 280 values in that
case. Conversely, for each of these 280 values there exists a tuple (m,m′, k) such that m is set to the chosen
value and, the pair (m,m′) follows the truncated characteristic.
Proof. The proof uses rebound-like arguments borrowed from the hash function cryptanalysis domain [22]. Let
(m,m′) be a right pair. We show in the following how the knowledge of 10 particular bytes restricts the values
of the 24 parameters used to construct the multisets, namely:
x2[0, 1, 2, 3], x3[0, . . . , 15], x4[0, 5, 10, 15]. (3)
In the sequel, we use the state names mentioned in Figure 4. The 10 bytes
∆z1[0], x2[0, 1, 2, 3], ∆w4[0], z4[0, 1, 2, 3]. (4)
can take as many as 280 possible values, and for each of them, we can determine the values of all the differences
shown on Figure 4: linearly in x2, applying the SBox to reach y2, linearly for x3 and similarly in the other
direction starting from z4. By the differential property of the AES SBox (Proposition 1), we get on average one
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Figure 4: Truncated differential characteristic used in the middle of the 7-round attacks on AES. A hatched byte denotes
a non-zero difference, whereas a while cell has no difference.
value for each of the 16 bytes of state x33. From the known values around the two AddRoundKey layers of
rounds 3 and 4, this suggests four bytes of the equivalent subkey u2 = MC−1(k2) and four others in subkey k3:
those are u2[0], u2[7], u2[10], u2[13] and k3[0], k3[5], k3[10], k3[15]; they are marked by a bullet (•) in Figure 4.
The converse is now trivial: the only difficulty is to prove that for each value of the 8 key bytes, there exists
a corresponding master key. This actually gives a chosen-key distinguisher for 7 rounds of AES, as it has been
done in [14].
To construct the multiset for each of the 280 possible choice for the 10 bytes from (4), we consider all the
28 − 1 possible values for the difference ∆y1[0], and propagate them until x5. This leads to a multiset of 28 − 1
differences in ∆x5[0]. Finally, as the AES SBox behaves as a permutation over F256, the sequence in ∆y1[0]
allows to derive the sequence in ∆x1[0]. Note that in the present case where there is a single byte of difference
between m and m′ in the state x1, both messages belongs to the same δ-set. This does not hold if we consider
more active bytes as we will see in Section 4. We describe in an algorithmic manner this proof in Algorithm 2
of Appendix C (ConstructTable). uunionsq
3.2 Simple Attack
Precomputation phase. In the precomputation phase of the attack, we build the lookup table that contains
the 280 multisets for difference ∆x5 by following the proof of Proposition 2. This step is performed by first
iterating on the 280 possible values for the 10 bytes of (4) and for each of them, we deduce the possible values
of the 24 original parameters. Then, for each of them, we construct the multiset of 28− 1 differences. Using the
3In fact, only 264 values of the 10 bytes lead to a solution for x3 but for each value, there are 216 solutions for x3.
differential property of the AES SBox (Proposition 1), we can count exactly the number of multisets that are
computed:
280 ×
(
4× 2
8 − 1
(28 − 1)2 + 2×
(28 − 1)(27 − 1− 1)
(28 − 1)2
)16
≈ 280.09. (5)
Finally, the lookup table of the 280.09 possible multisets that we simplify to 280 requires about 282 128-bit blocks
to be stored. To construct the table, we have to perform 280 partial encryptions on 256 messages, which we
estimate to be equivalent to 284 encryptions.
Online phase. The online phase splits into three parts: the first one finds pairs of messages that conform to
the truncated differential characteristic of ??, which embeds the previous 4-round characteristic in the middle
rounds. The second step uses the found pairs to create a δ-set and test them against the precomputed table and
retrieve the secret key in a final phase.
To generate one pair of messages conforming to the 7-full-round characteristic where there are only four active
bytes in both the plaintext and the ciphertext differences, we prepare a structure of 232 plaintexts where the
diagonal takes all the possible 232 values, and the remaining 12 bytes are fixed to some constants. Hence, each of
the 232× (232−1)/2 ≈ 263 pairs we can generate satisfies the plaintext difference. Among the 263 corresponding
ciphertext pairs, we expect 263 · 2−96 = 2−33 to verify the truncated difference pattern. Finding one such pair
then requires 233 structures of 232 messages and 232+33 = 265 encryptions under the secret key. Using this secret
key, the probability that the whole truncated characteristic of ?? is verified is 2−2×3×8 = 2−48 because of the
two 4→ 1 transitions in the MixColumns of rounds 0 and 5. By repeating the previous procedure to find 248
pairs, one is expected to verify the full 7-round characteristic. All in all, we ask the encryptions of 248+65 = 2113
messages to find 248 pairs of messages. Note that we do not have to examine each pair in order to find the right
one. Indeed, if a pair verifies the full 7-round characteristic, then the ciphertext difference has only four active
bytes. Thus, we can store the structures in a hash table indexed by the 12 inactive bytes to get the right pairs
in average time of one.
For each of the 248 pairs, we get 28×(8−2×3) · 28 = 224 suggestions for the 9 key bytes:
k−1[0, 5, 10, 15], u5[0], u6[0, 7, 10, 13]. (6)
Indeed, there are 28 possibilities for the bytes from k−1 since the pair of diagonals in x0 need to be active only
in w0 after the MixColumns operation. Among the 232 possible values for those bytes, only 232 × 2−24 = 28
verifies the truncated pattern. The same reasoning applies for u6[0, 7, 10, 13], and the last byte u5[0] can take
all the 28 values.
For all 224 possibilities, we construct a δ-set to use the precomputed table. To do so, we partially decrypt
the diagonal of one message, using the four known bytes from k−1 and consider the 28 − 1 possible non-zero
differences for ∆x1[0]. This gives one set of 28 plaintexts, whose corresponding ciphertexts may be partially
decrypted using the four known bytes from u6 and the one from u5. Once decrypted, we can construct the
multiset of differences for ∆x5 and check if it lies in the precomputed lookup table. If not, we can discard the
subkey with certainty. On the other hand, the probability for a wrong guess to pass this test is smaller than
280 · 2−467.6 = 2−387.6 so, as we try 248 · 224 = 272 multisets, only the right subkey should verify the test.
Note that the probability is 2−467.6 (and not 2−506.17) because the number of ordered sequences associated to
a multiset is not constant.
We summarize the above description in the following Algorithm 1, where the initial call to the function
ConstructTable(0, 0) constructs the lookup table for ∆x1 and ∆x5 both at position zero (Figure 4) and is
defined in Appendix C.
To evaluate the complexity of the online phase of the simple attack, we count the number of AES encryptions.
First, we ask the encryption of 2113 chosen-plaintexts, so that the time complexity for that step is already 2113
encryptions. Then, for each of the 248 found pairs, we perform 224 partial encryptions/decryptions of a δ-set. We
evaluate the time complexity of this part to 248+24+8 · 2−5 = 275 encryptions since we can do the computations
in a good ordering as shown in Algorithm 1. All in all, the time complexity is dominated by 2113 encryptions,
the data complexity is 2113 chosen-plaintexts, and the memory complexity is 282 since it requires to store 280
multisets.
3.3 Efficient Attack: New Property F
Unlike the previous attacks where the bottleneck complexity is the memory, our attack uses a smaller table
which makes the time complexity to find the pairs the dominating one. Therefore, we would like to decrease the
time spent in that phase. The natural idea is to find a new property F for the four middle rounds that can be
Algorithm 1 – A simple attack.
1: function SimpleAttack
2: T0,0 ← ConstructTable(0, 0). # Construction of the Table (Appendix C)
3: while true do # 281 times on average
4: Ask for a structure S of 232 plaintexts Pm where bytes in diagonals 0 assume all values.
5: Empty a hash table T of list of plaintexts.
6: for all corresponding ciphertexts Cm do
7: index← MC−1(Cm)[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15].
8: for all P ∈ T [index] do
9: Consider the pair (P, Pm). # 2−33 pairs by structure on average
10: for all k−1[0, 5, 10, 15] s.t. ∆w0[1, 2, 3] = 0 do # 28 times on average
11: Construct δ-set D from P . # The δ-set belongs to the structure
12: for all u6[0, 7, 10, 13] s.t. ∆z5[1, 2, 3] = 0 do
13: Decrypt column 0 of x6 for D.
14: for all u5[0] do # 28 times
15: Decrypt byte 0 of x5 for D.
16: Construct multiset M of ∆x5.
17: if M ∈ T0,0 then
18: return ExhaustiveSearch()
19: T [index]← T [index] ∪ {Pm}.
20: end while
checked more efficiently. To do so, we reuse the idea of Dunkelman et al. from [15], which adds an active byte
in the second round of the differential characteristic. The sequence of active bytes becomes:
8
R0−→ 2 R1−→ 4 R2−→ 16 R3−→ 4 R4−→ 1 R5−→ 4 R6−→ 16, (7)
with the constraint that the two active bytes of the second round belong to the same diagonal to be transformed
in a column in the next round.
∆P
∆x0 ∆z0 ∆x1 ∆z1 ∆x2 ∆z2
∆x3 ∆z3 ∆x4 ∆z4 ∆x5 ∆z5 ∆x6 ∆z6
∆C
Figure 5: Example of a truncated differential characteristic used in the efficient attack on 7 rounds.
As a consequence, it is now easier to find pairs conforming to that truncated differential characteristic. Indeed,
the size of the structures of plaintexts may take as many as 264 different values, so that we can construct at
most 264 · (264 − 1)/2 = 2127 pairs from each structure. Therefore, it is enough to ask the encryption of
28·3·3/2127−8·12 = 241 structures to get 272 pairs with the desired output difference pattern, and expect one to
conform to the 7-round characteristic of Figure 5. Consequently in this new setting, we only need 2105 chosen
plaintexts. In return, the number of pairs that the adversary has to consider is increased by a factor 224 and so is
the time complexity. Furthermore, we now need 11 parameters to generate the 24 parameters of the precomputed
table, increasing the memory requirement by a factor 28. These parameters are the previous 10 ones and the
difference in the second active byte of z2. All in all, the time complexity of this attack is 275+24 = 299 encryptions,
the data complexity is 2105 chosen plaintexts and the memory requirement is 282+8 = 290 128-bit blocks.
Note that the time spent on one pair is the same for both the simple attack and the new one. Indeed, let K
be the key bytes needed to construct the multiset. We suppose that we have a set of pairs such that one follows
the differential. To find it, and incidentally some key-byte values, we proceed as follows: for each pair (m,m′),
enumerate all possible values of K such that (m,m′,K) have a non-zero probability to follow the differential.
For each of them, construct the corresponding multiset from m or m′. If it belongs to the table, then we expect
that it follows the differential characteristic since the table has been constructed that way. Otherwise, we know
with probability 1 that either the pair (m,m′) does not satisfy the characteristic, or the guessed value from K
is wrong.
Assuming that the bytes of diagonals 0 and 2 of the structure of plaintexts takes all the values4, the two
differences in the first state of the second round can take four different positions: (0, 10), (1, 11), (2, 8) and (3, 9).
Similarly, the position of the active byte in the penultimate round is not constrained; it can be placed anywhere
on the 16 positions. We can also consiser the opposite: one active byte at the beginning, and two active bytes in
the end. These possibilities actually define tweaked versions of the propertyF and allows to trade some time for
memory: with less data, we can check more tables for the same final probability of success. Namely, by storing
4 × 16 + (42) × 4 = 28 tables to cover all the cases by adapting the proof of Proposition 2, the encryption of
241/28 = 233 structures of 264 plaintexts suffices to expect a hit in one of the 28 tables. Therefore, the memory
complexity reaches 298 AES blocks and the time complexity remains unchanged since we analyze 28 times less
pairs, but the quantity of work to check one pair is multiplied by the same factor. We describe this efficient
attack in an algorithmic manner in Appendix D
3.4 Turning the distinguisher into a key recovery attack
In this section, we present an efficient way to turn this distinguisher into a key recovery attack. First, let us
summarize what the adversary has in his possession at the end of the efficient attack: a pair (m,m′) following the
truncated differential characteristic, a δ-set containing m, the knowledge of 9 key bytes and the corresponding
multiset for which we found a match in the precomputed table. Thus, there are still 256, 2120 or 2184 possible
keys, if we consider AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 respectively. As a consequence, performing an exhaustive
search to find the missing key bytes would drastically increase the complexity of the whole attack, except for
the 128-bit version. Even in that case, it seems nontrivial to recover the 256 possible keys in less than 296, as
the 9 key bytes do not belong to the same subkey.
A natural way to recover the missing bytes would be to replay the efficient attack by using different positions
for the input and output differences. Unfortunately, this increases the complexity, and it would also interfere
with the trade-off since we could not look for all the possible positions of the differences anymore.
We propose a method that recovers the two last subkeys in a negligible time compared to the 299 encryptions
of the efficient attack. First the adversary guesses the 11 parameters used to build the table of multisets,
computes the value the corresponding 24 parameters and keeps the only one used to build the checked multiset.
In particular, he obtains the value of the all intermediate state x3 and one column of x2. As a consequence,
and for any position of the active byte of x5, the Demerci and Selçuk original attack may be performed really
quickly. Indeed, among the 9 (resp. 24) bytes to guess to perform the online (resp. oﬄine) phase, at least 4
(resp. 20) are already known and the data needed is also in his possession. Finally, the adversary do this attack
for each position of the active byte of x5 and thus retrieves the two last subkeys.
4 Extension to more rounds
4.1 8-round attacks on AES-192 and AES-256
We can extend the simple attack on the AES presented Section 3.2 to an 8-round attack for both 192- and
256-bit versions by adding one additional round at the end. This attack is schematized on Figure 6.
The main difficulty compared to the previous attack is that we cannot apply a first step to the structure to
filter the wrong pairs. Indeed, now for each pair from the structure, there exists at least one key such that the
pair follows the differential characteristic. Then our goal is to enumerate, for each pair and as fast as possible,
the key bytes needed to identify a δ-set and construct the associated multiset assuming that the pair is a right
one.
The main idea to do so is the following: if there is a single non-zero difference in a column of a state before
(resp. after) theMixColumns operation, then the difference on same column in the state after (resp. before) can
only assume 28−1 values among all the (28−1)4 possible ones. Combining this with the key schedule equations
and to the differential property of the AES SBox (Proposition 1), this leads to an attack requiring 2113 chosen
plaintexts, 282 128-bit blocks of storage and a time complexity equivalent to 2172 (resp. 2196) encryptions on
AES-192 (resp. AES-256).
To reach this time complexity, the position of the output active byte must be chosen carefully. The position
of the input active byte for both the pair and the δ-set must be identical, as well as the output active byte of
4Those are bytes 0, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13 and 15.
Px0 z0 x1 z1 x2 z2 x3 z3
x4 z4 x5 z5 x6 z6 x7 z7
C
Figure 6: Scheme of the attack on 8 rounds. Gray bytes are needed to identify a δ-set and to build the multiset. Black
bytes are needed to construct the table. White bytes are constant for a δ-set. If differences in hashed bytes are null then
black bytes can be derived from the difference in circled bytes.
the pair and the byte that is to be checked. Then, the output difference must be located at position 1, 6, 11 or
12 in the case of AES-192. As for the AES-256, it can be located anywhere, except on bytes 0, 5, 10 and 15.
Finally, in both cases, the position of the input difference does not matter.
Assume that the positions of the input and output active bytes are respectively 0 and 1. In the first stage of
the attack, we ask for the encryption of 281 structures of 232 plaintexts. Then, the following procedure applied
on each of the 281 · 232+31 = 2144 pairs allows to enumerate the 224 possible values for the needed key bytes in
about 224 simple operations for the 192-bit version:
1. (a) Guess the difference in column 0 of x0.
(b) Deduce the actual values in this column.
(c) Deduce bytes 0, 5, 10 and 15 of k−1.
(d) Store all these values in a hash table T−1 indexed by k−1[15].
2. Guess the difference in column 3 of x6.
3. (a) Guess the difference in columns 0 and 1 of x7.
(b) Deduce the actual values of these two columns.
(c) Deduce the actual values of x6[14] and x6[15].
(d) Deduce u6[3], u6[6] and bytes 0, 1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of k7 (or u7 if we do not omit the last
MixColumns).
(e) Store all these values in a hash table T7.
4. (a) Similarly, guess the difference in the two other columns of x7 and deduce u6[9], u6[12] and the 8 others
bytes of the last subkey.
(b) Retrieve u6[3], u6[6] and bytes 0, 1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of k7 (resp. u7) using T7 since u6[3] and u6[6]
are linearly dependent of k7 (and also of u7).
(c) Deduce u5[13] and k−1[15] from k7.
(d) Get bytes 0, 5 and 10 of k−1 using T−1.
The fact we can deduce u5[13], u6[3], u6[6] comes from the following observation.
Proposition 3. By the key schedule of AES-192, knowledge of the subkey k7 allows to linearly deduce columns
0 and 1 of k6 and column 3 of k5.
In contrast, to deduce k−1[15] from k7, we need a more complicated observation made by Dunkelman et al.
in [15].
Proposition 4 (Key bridging, [15]). By the key schedule of AES-192, the knowledge of columns 0, 1, 3 of
the subkey k7 allows to deduce column 3 of the whitening key k−1.
Note that it is now easy to see why the choice of the input active byte does not affect the complexity and why
only four positions for the output active byte lead to the minimal complexity.
Finally, for each of the 2144 pairs and for each of the 224 subkeys corresponding to one pair, the adversary
identifies the δ-set and verifies whether the corresponding multiset belongs to the precomputed table. Thus, the
time complexity of this part is equivalent to 2144 · 224 · 28 · 2−4 = 2172 encryptions.
In the case of the 256-bit version, k6 and k7 are independent and the only key schedule property we can use
is the following one.
Proposition 5. By the key schedule of AES-256, knowledge of the subkey k7 allows to linearly deduce columns
1, 2 and 3 of k5.
Then, there are 248 possible values for the required key bytes and a procedure like the previous one enumerates
them in 248 simple operations.
It is possible to save some data in exchange for memory by considering several differentials in parallel. We
can bypass the fact that all the positions for the output active byte does not lead in the same complexity by
performing the check on y5 instead of x5. This is done by just adding one parameter to the precomputed table
and increases its size by a factor 28. Then, we can look for all the 4 · 16 = 26 differentials in parallel on the
same structure. All in all, the data complexity and the memory requirement become respectively 2107 chosen
plaintexts and 296 128-bit blocks.
4.2 9-round attack on AES-256
The 8-round attack on AES-256 can be extended to an attack on 9-round by adding one round right in the
middle. This only increases the memory requirements: the time and data complexities remain unchanged. More
precisely, the number of parameters needed to construct the precomputed table turns out to be 24 + 16 = 40,
but they can only assume 28×(10+16) = 2208 different values. All in all, the data complexity of the attack stays
at 2113 chosen-plaintexts, the time complexity remains 2196 encryptions and the memory requirement reaches
about 2210 128-bit blocks. To reduce its complexity, we can cover only a fraction 2−7 of the possible multisets
stored in the precomputed table. In return, the data and time complexities are increased by a factor 27 by
replaying the attack several times. This way, we reach the complexities mentioned in Table 1. This attack is
schematized on Figure 7.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have provided improved cryptanalysis of reduced round variants of all the AES versions in
the standard single-key model, where the adversary wants to recover the secret key. In particular, we present an
attack on 7-round of all AES versions that runs in less than 2100 encryptions of chosen-plaintexts. To the best
of our knowledge, this is currently the most efficient result on AES-128 in this model. Additionally, we show
we can turn this algorithm into attacks for AES-192 and AES-256 on 8 rounds, in time equivalent to 2172 and
2196 encryptions respectively, and we even reach an attack on 9 rounds of AES-256 in about 2203 encryptions.
Those results fit into the scheme on both differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks, which have been
extensively studied in the past. More precisely, our algorithms improve on known techniques by drastically
reducing the memory requirements so that the overall bottleneck switches from memory complexity in the
previous meet-in-the-middle attacks to time or data complexity in our case.
As those complexities remain merely theoretical and also because the AES provides a good security margin,
the block cipher is not threatened. Nevertheless, we believe the strategy behind these algorithms may pave the
way for new cryptanalysis techniques.
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A Multiset Representation
As there are about
(
28+28−1
28
) ≈ 2506.17 multisets of 256 elements from F256, we are able to represent them on
512 bits. Here is one way of doing it for a given multisetM . In the sequel, we consider thatM = {xn11 , . . . , xnmm },
with
∑m
i=1 ni = 256, that we may represent by
x1 x1 x1 x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
∣∣∣ x2 x2 x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2
∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ xm xm xm xm xm︸ ︷︷ ︸
nm
, (8)
where the distinct elements are the m elements xi, which appears each with multiplicity ni. In M , the order of
the elements is undetermined.
Consider the set S = {x1, . . . , xm} deduced from M by deleting any repetition of element in M . As there
are at most 256 elements in S, we can encode whether e ∈ F256 belongs to S in a 256-bit number s by a 1-bit
flag at the position e seen as an index in [0, . . . , 255] in s. Then, to express the repetition of element, we sort
M using the natural order in the integers and consider the sequence of multiplicity of each distinct element:
if x1 < · · · < xm, then we consider the sequence n1, . . . , nm. We use a second 256-bit number t to store the
sequence of (
∑i
j=1 nj)i seen as indexes in t, which actually encodes the positions of the vertical separators in
the multiset representation (8). The 512-bit element (s, t) then represents the multiset M .
B All Key-Schedule versions of AES
«S
(a) AES-128.
«S
(b) AES-192
«S
S
(c) AES-256
Figure 8: Key schedules of the variants of the AES: AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256.
C Construction of tables
Algorithm 2 – Construction of the tables.
1: function ConstructTable(i, j)
2: bi ← i− 4(i mod 4) mod 16. # Retrieving the right positions
3: ci ← bbi/4c. # because of the ShiftRows.
4: cj ← bj/4c.
5: Empty a lookup table T .
6: Guess values of the five bytes ∆z1[bi], x2[4ci], x2[4ci + 1], x2[4ci + 2], x2[4ci + 3].
7: Deduce differences in ∆x3.
8: Guess values of the five bytes ∆w4[j], w4[4cj ], w4[4cj + 1], w4[4cj + 2], w4[4cj + 3].
9: Deduce differences in ∆y3.
10: Use the differential property of the AES SBox to deduce the values in x3 and x′3.
11: Deduce SR−1(u2)[4ci], SR−1(u2)[4ci + 1], SR−1(u2)[4ci + 2], SR−1(u2)[4ci + 3].
12: Deduce SR(k3)[4cj ], SR(k3)[4cj + 1], SR(k3)[4cj + 2], SR(k3)[4cj + 3].
13: Empty a multiset M .
14: for all the differences ∆z1[bi] do
15: Obtain a column x2, and then a state x3.
16: Add ∆x5[j] to M .
17: Add M to the lookup table T .
18: return T of size ≈ 280.
1: function ConstructTable2(i, j)
2: bi ← i− 4(i mod 4) mod 16. # x1[i] must be located on column 0
3: ci ← bbi/4c.
4: k ← ((i+ 1) mod 4) + 4. # Position of the active byte on column 1 of x1
5: bk ← k − 4(k mod 4) mod 16.
6: cj ← bj/4c.
7: Empty a lookup table T .
8: Guess values of the six bytes ∆z1[bi], ∆z1[bk], x2[4ci], x2[4ci + 1], x2[4ci + 2], x2[4ci + 3].
9: Deduce differences in ∆x3.
10: Guess values of the five bytes ∆w4[j], w4[4cj ], w4[4cj + 1], w4[4cj + 2], w4[4cj + 3].
11: Deduce differences in ∆y3.
12: Use the differential property of the AES SBox to deduce the values in x3 and x′3.
13: Deduce SR−1(u2)[4ci], SR−1(u2)[4ci + 1], SR−1(u2)[4ci + 2], SR−1(u2)[4ci + 3].
14: Deduce SR(k3)[4cj ], SR(k3)[4cj + 1], SR(k3)[4cj + 2], SR(k3)[4cj + 3].
15: Empty a multiset M .
16: for all the differences ∆z1[bi] do
17: Obtain a column x2, and then a state x3.
18: Add ∆x5[j] to M .
19: Add M to the lookup table T .
20: return T of size ≈ 288.
D Efficient Attack
Algorithm 3 – An efficient attack.
1: function EfficientAttack
2: for all (i, j) ∈ {0, . . . , 3} × {0, . . . , 15} do # Construction of the 26 Tables
3: Ti,j ← ConstructTable2(i, j).
4: while true do # 235 times on average
5: Ask for a structure S of 264 plaintexts Pm where bytes in diagonals 0 and 1 assume all values.
6: for all k ∈ {0, . . . , 3} do # Position of the non-zero column of ∆x6
7: Empty a hash table T of list of plaintexts.
8: for all corresponding ciphertexts Cm do
9: index← (SR−1 ◦MC−1(Cm))[{0, . . . , 15} − {4k, . . . , 4k + 3}].
10: for all P ∈ T [index] do
11: Consider the pair (P, Pm). # 233 pairs by structure on average
12: for all (i, lj) ∈ {0, . . . , 3} × {0, . . . , 3} do
13: j ← 4k − 3lj mod 16. # Assume mod give a positive result.
14: OnlinePhase ((P, Pm) , i, j, Ti,j , S).
15: T [index]← T [index] ∪ {Pm}.
16: end while
1: function OnlinePhase((m,m′) , i, j, T, S)
2: bj ← (j − 4× (j mod 4)) mod 16. # Retrieving the right positions
3: cj ← bbj/4c. # because of the ShiftRows.
4: Colj ← {4cj , . . . , 4cj + 3}
5: for all k−1[0, 5, 10, 15] s.t. ∆w0[{0, . . . , 3} − {i}] = 0 do
6: Construct δ-set D from m.
7: for all SR(u6)[Colj ] s.t. ∆z5[Colj − {j}] = 0 do
8: Decrypt column cj of x6 for D.
9: for all u5[bj ] do
10: Decrypt byte j of x5 for D.
11: Construct multiset M of ∆x5.
12: if M ∈ T then
13: return ExhaustiveSearch()
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